Friday, September 13, 2013

Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing

The RAND Corporation Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing Author(s): Lode Li Reviewed work(s): root word: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, no 4 ( pass, 1985), pp. 521-536 Published by: Blackwell create on behalf of The RAND Corporation Stable universal resource locater: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555510 . Accessed: 08/12/2011 20:53 Your use of the JSTOR gunstock indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/ rapscallion/ selective data/ close/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a unsubtle range of content in a trust digital archive. We use data technology and tools to increase productivity and alleviate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, transport receive support@jstor.org. Blackwell Publishing and The RAND Corporation ar collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, push and l ive on access to The RAND Journal of Economics. http://www.jstor.org Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1985 Cournotoligopoly with informationsharing Lode Li* This article examines the incentivesfor Cournot oligopolists to share information about a common parameteror aboutfirm-specificparameters.
Ordercustompaper.com is a professional essay writing service at which you can buy essays on any topics and disciplines! All custom essays are written by professional writers!
We assume that theprivate information that firms receive has fit true statement and obeys a linear conditional medical prognosis property. We find that when the doubtfulness is about a firm-specific parameter, perfect apocalypse is the unique equilibrium. When the uncertaintyis about a common para meter, no information sharing is the unique! equilibrium. still the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the total core of information increases. Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of firms becomes large. 1. groundwork * This article studies the incentives for information sharingamong firms in an oligopolistic industry...If you want to see a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

If you want to get a full essay, visit our page: write my paper

No comments:

Post a Comment